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KEY FACTORS IN WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IN THE 
BRAZILIAN MARKET
FATORES DETERMINANTES DA GESTãO DO CAPITAL DE GIRO NO MERCADO BRASILEIRO
FACTORES DETERMINANTES DE LA GESTIÓN DEL CAPITAL DE GIRO EN EL MERCADO BRASILEÑO
ABSTRACT
Many studies have been conducted in corporate fi-
nance regarding long-term investment and financing 
decisions. However, short-term asset investments play 
a significant role in the balance sheet of companies. 
Moreover, financial managers dedicate significant 
amounts of time and effort to the subject of working 
capital management, balancing current assets and lia-
bilities. This paper provides insights regarding the key 
factors of working capital management by exploring 
the internal variables of a number of companies. This 
study used data from 2,976 Brazilian public companies 
from 2001 to 2008, and found that debt level, size and 
growth rate can affect the working capital management 
of companies. 
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RESUMO Muitos estudos já foram realizados sobre finanças corporativas, com relação a decisões de financiamento e investimento de 
longo prazo. Porém, os investimentos em ativos de curto prazo desempenham um papel importante no balanço patrimonial das empresas. 
Além disso, os gestores financeiros dedicam quantidade significativa de tempo e esforço ao tema do gerenciamento do capital de giro, 
equilibrando realizáveis e exigíveis de curto prazo. Este artigo apresenta insights sobre os fatores determinantes do gerenciamento de capital 
de giro, explorando variáveis internas de várias empresas. O estudo usou dados de 2.976 empresas brasileiras de capital aberto referentes 
ao período entre 2001 e 2008 e concluiu que o nível de dívidas, o tamanho da empresa e a taxa de crescimento podem afetar a gestão 
do capital de giro das empresas.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE Capital de giro, gestão financeira, dados em painel, Brasil, liquidez. 
Resumen Muchos estudios ya se realizaron sobre finanzas corporativas, con relación a decisiones de financiación e inversión a largo plazo. No obstante, 
las inversiones en activos a corto plazo desempeñan un papel importante en el balance patrimonial de las empresas. Además, los gerentes financieros 
dedican cantidades significativas de tiempo y esfuerzo al tema de la administración del capital de giro, equilibrando realizables y exigibles a corto plazo. 
Este artículo presenta insights sobre los factores determinantes de la administración del capital de giro, explorando variables internas de varias empresas. 
Este estudio usó datos referentes al período de 2001 a 2008 de 2.976 empresas brasileñas de capital abierto y concluyó que el nivel de deudas, el tamaño 
de la empresa y la tasa de crecimiento pueden afectar la administración del capital de giro de las empresas. 
Palabras clave Capital de giro, factores determinantes, datos en panel, Brasil, liquidez.
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INTRODUCTION
Any researcher who conducts an overview of the cor-
porate finance literature will find no robust, widely ac-
cepted theory about working capital management. So 
far, few studies have been conducted on this subject 
compared to long-term corporate finance. Additionally, 
the majority of related empirical studies have focused 
on its relationship with company profitability, not on 
its key factors. Decisions related to working capital 
management have a direct impact both on liquidity 
and profitability (APPUHAMI, 2008; SHIN and SOENEN, 
1998). According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008), 
there is still little knowledge about the ideal liquidity 
level, understood as current assets, in order to maxi-
mize company value. 
Many internal as well as external factors can influ-
ence corporate decisions relating to the optimal level 
of current assets and current liabilities. Among these 
factors is the influence of corporate financing decisions. 
One of the most relevant theories about capital structure 
is the Pecking Order Model, by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
According to this theory, companies tend to consume 
financial slack in order to raise internal capital before 
increasing financial leverage by borrowing money from 
outside or issuing new stocks. 
In order to raise capital for an investment, managers 
could easily dispose of liquid current assets, adopting 
an aggressive working capital policy, such as pressuring 
for lower levels of inventory and decreasing customer 
credit terms. 
Another factor affecting company decisions regard-
ing working capital level could be related to the conflict 
of interests between managers and shareholders, as ex-
amined in the Agency Theory (JENSEN and MEcklINg, 
1976). In companies with a low level of monitoring and 
few instruments to discipline management decisions, 
managers might decide not to invest in projects with a 
positive net present value, or they might even decide 
to invest in projects with a negative net present value. 
Another source of agency problems is the excess of 
free cash flow, defined by Jensen (1986) as the cash 
flow beyond what is necessary to finance positive net 
present value projects. This author affirms that a con-
text of substantial free cash flow makes managers more 
likely to invest in projects with negative net present 
value, increasing agency problems between managers 
and shareholders. Some of these projects and activities 
“[…] may be self-gratifying to the managers and may 
bring them some pecuniary benefits or other personal 
rewards […]” (cHUNg, MIcHAEl and kIM, 2005, p. 
55). In other cases, managers could treat investment 
decisions carelessly, adopting a more flexible working 
capital policy, with a high level of inventory or a gen-
erous credit policy beyond operational needs.
The discussion about the main factors of working 
capital management is not a simple one. Most studies 
about working capital management have focused on 
its relations with company profitability, by assessing 
the impact of working capital policies on the creation 
of value to shareholder. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the main factors of working capital manage-
ment in order to increase knowledge about corporate 
finance, especially short-term decision-making, and to 
improve corporate decision-making. In the international 
literature, especially major finance and accounting jour-
nals, there are few empirical studies testing modern 
theories about corporate finance in this respect. This 
study focused on Brazilian companies listed in São 
Paulo Stock Exchange in the period from 2001 to 2008. 
We decided to study the Brazilian perspective because 
so far there are no records of any studies focusing on 
this specific issue in the Brazilian market. With regards 
to the country, good management of working capital 
is clearly relevant to the operational performance of 
Brazilian companies, given the high costs of short-term 
loans and the difficulties to obtain funding for the per-
manent needs of working capital.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Working capital management is a relevant subject to fi-
nancial managers who dedicate significant amounts of 
time and effort seeking an ideal balance between risk and 
return, profitability and liquidity, in order to create value 
for the company (lAMBErSON, 1995; APPUHAMI, 2008; 
MArTIN and MOrgAN in kIM and SrINIvASAN, 1991). 
Making decisions about policies, monitoring the perfor-
mance of each component, as well as taking actions to 
minimize targets deviations is a frequent, repetitive and 
time-consuming work (lAMBErSON, 1995, Appuhami, 
2008). The lack of understanding about its impact on 
profitability, the lack of clarity about its key factors, the 
lack of management ability to plan and control working 
capital components may lead to insolvency and bank-
ruptcy. Smith (1973) suggested that many businesses 
have failed due to the inability of financial managers to Nathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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plan and control current assets and current liabilities in 
their companies. In Brazil, a recent study with 14,181 
small companies had the same findings (SEBrAE, 2005). 
Despite its relevance for business success (FIlBEck and 
krUEgEr, 2005), there are few studies and consolidated 
theories dedicated to this theme worldwide. Particularly 
in Brazil, studies have focused on understanding each 
individual component of working capital and analyzing 
liquidity risk (FlEUrIET, 2003; MArqUES and BrAgA, 
1995; lOPES, 2005; MESqUITA, 2008). The following 
studies were collected from international literature, and 
they contribute to understand the key factors of work-
ing capital management, taking into consideration the 
combined effect of its main components: inventory, ac-
counts receivable and accounts payable. 
Nunn (1981) approached working capital require-
ments by dividing them into seasonal and permanent 
necessities (gITMAN, 1997). This author examined the 
permanent ratio of working capital, i.e. the ratio that 
does not vary according to short-term changes in the 
business activities of companies. Using data from dif-
ferent industries, from 1971 to 1978, that study found 
19 possible key factors of working capital management, 
and they were related to production process, sales, 
accounting method, competitive position and industry 
factors. Hawawini, viallet, and vora (1986) examined 
data from 1,181 American companies from 36 indus-
tries over a 19-year period (1960-1979). These authors 
found that industry had a significant, persistent effect on 
the investments of companies, and that this effect was 
sustained over the time. The study also found industry 
benchmarks which companies adhered to when setting 
their working policies on capital investment. Filbeck 
and krueger (2005) provided insights to support the 
relevance of an efficient working capital management, 
assessing nearly 1,000 companies in United States in the 
period from 1996 to 2000. Their study found significant 
differences between industries regarding working capi-
tal measures over time, as well as significant changes in 
those measures within industries over time. The authors 
suggested that these changes could be related to the 
macroeconomic factors such as interest rate, innovation 
rate and competition. Using data from a panel of U.S. 
corporations from 1990 to 2004, kieschnick, laplante 
and Moussawi (2006) found that industry practices, 
company size, future sales growth, number of out-
side directors on the board, executive compensation 
(current portion), and cEO share ownership have a 
significant impact on the efficiency of working capital 
management of companies. Their study suggested that 
managers responded positively to both incentives and 
monitoring regarding working capital management. 
Using economic indicators as independent variables 
and financial ratios as dependent variables, lamber-
son (1995) explored the relationship between changes 
in working capital position and changes in the level 
of economic activity, using a sample of 50 U.S. small 
companies from 1980 to 1991. His study found that 
liquidity slightly increased during economic expan-
sions, while no noticeable liquidity change was found 
during economic slowdowns. Sathyamoorthi and Wally-
Dima (2008) analyzed domestic retail companies listed 
in Botswana Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2006, and 
found that companies tended to adopt a conservative 
approach in times of high business volatility, while an 
aggressive approach was more likely to be adopted in 
times of low volatility. chiou, cheng and Wu (2006) 
explored the key factors of working capital manage-
ment, using 19,180 company-quarter data from Taiwan 
Stock Exchange in the period from 1996 to 2004. Their 
study suggested that debt ratio and operating cash flow 
affected the working capital of companies. On the other 
side, no evidence was found to support the impact 
of business cycle, industry effect, company growth, 
company performance and company size on working 
capital management. Nazir and Afza (2008) studied 
the key factors in the requirements of working capital 
management, using 204 manufacturing companies from 
16 industrial groups listed at karachi Stock Exchange, 
Pakistan, in the period from 1998 to 2006. These au-
thors found that operating cycle, leverage, rOA and 
Tobins’q had a significant impact on working capital 
requirements. Appuhami (2008) investigated the impact 
of corporate capital expenses on working capital man-
agement, using data collected from listed companies in 
the Thailand Stock Exchange, from 2000 to 2005. The 
study found a negative relation with capital expenses, 
suggesting that companies tended to manage working 
capital efficiently when they could find opportunities to 
grow by investing in fixed assets. The study also found 
a positive, significant relation between working capital 
requirements and operating and finance expenses, sug-
gesting that companies tended to increase their working 
capital levels as debt and interest expenses increased. 
A summary of the independent variables in each 
study, including their hypotheses and findings, is shown 
in Exhibit 1.
Pecking order theory
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(continua)
Researchers
Dependent 
variable proxies-
Working Capital 
Management
Independent variables
Hypotheses: 
coefficient 
sign:
Findings: 
coefficient 
sign
Nunn (1981) Permanent working 
capital/sales
Production-related variables:  small batch production, order 
backlog rate; capital intensity and relative product-line breadth
Production-related variables: on-going production rate; utiliza-
tion and made-to-order product.
Sales-related variables: media advertising/ Sales component ratio
Sales-related variables: Sales force expenses/Sales and Gross 
margin rate – channels.
Accounting method
Competitive position: relative market share and relative image
Competitive position: market share instability and relative price
Industry factors: industry export,  import and concentration
+ 
- 
-
+ 
+
-
+
+
+ significant 
- significant 
- significant
+ significant 
+ significant
- significant
+ significant
+ significant
Hawawini, 
Viallet and 
Vora (1986)
Working capital 
requirement-to-sales 
ratio
Working capital requirement-to-sales ratios within industries
No significant 
differences
No significant 
differences
Kieschnick, 
Laplante and 
Moussawi 
(2006)
Logarithm of cash 
Conversion Cycle
Industry practices
Company size
fixed assets ratio
Company sales growth
Market power (Herfindahl-Hirschman index)
Board characteristics measured by number of directors
Board characteristics measured by ratio of outside members
CEO compensation measured by total current compensation 
(stock options excluded)
CEO compensation measured by CEO total unexercised stock 
options.
Ratio of CEO-held stock
Governance index (provisions)
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
- 
- 
-
-
+ significant
+ significant
- not significant
+ significant
- not significant
- not significant
- significant
- significant 
- not significant 
+ significant
+ not significant
Lamberson 
(1995)
Current ratio
Quick ratio
Inventory/asset
Current asset/asset
Economic activity -
-
+
+
+ not significant
+ significant
- significant
- not significant
Exhibit 1 – Summary of independent variables, hypotheses and findings of the literature review
the information asymmetry that suggests that manag-
ers know more about the value of their company than 
potential investors (MyErS and MAJlUF, 1984). This 
information asymmetry affects the choice between in-
ternal and external financing. Based on this concept, 
the Pecking Order Theory states that companies tend 
to rely on internal funds to finance themselves, prefer-
ring to issue debt to equity when external financing 
is required (MyErS and MAJlUF, 1984). According to 
Nakamura and others (2007, p.76), this order is based 
on the assumption that  “[…] resources generated in-
ternally do not have transaction costs, and issuing new 
bonds tends to signal positive information about the 
company, while issuing new shares, on the contrary, Nathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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tends to signal negative information”. According to this 
point of view, companies do not pursue specific ob-
jectives regarding debt level; they use external funds 
only when internal funds are not enough (grAHAM 
and HArvEy, 2001). External sources of funds are 
less desirable because this manager-investor informa-
tion asymmetry implies that external sources of funds 
are underpriced in relation to the level of asymme-
try (MyErS and MAJlUF, 1984). According to chen 
(2004), this theory explains why companies choose 
to keep reserves in cash or other forms of financial 
slack – to avoid both lack of resources and the need 
for external sources. According to this point of view, 
cash is similar to “negative debt”; external resources 
are sought when there is a cash shortage; and debts 
are paid when there is an excess of cash. Therefore, 
the company chooses a more passive cash manage-
ment policy, waiting to settle existent debts whenever 
further costs are not involved (kOSHIO, 2005). 
Financial slack is the result of large withholdings 
of cash or marketable securities, or the ability to is-
sue default risk-free debt beyond what is necessary to 
meet current operating and debt servicing needs (My-
ErS and MAJlUF, 1984; BrEAlEy, MyErS and AllEN, 
Filbeck and 
Krueger 
(2005) 
Cash conversion 
consistency, days 
of working capital, 
inventory turnover 
and payables, CFO’s 
overall ranking.
Industry significance: working capital measures of different 
industries over time.
Period consistency: Working capital measures within industries 
over time
significant 
differences
significant 
differences
significant 
differences
significant 
differences
Chiou, Cheng 
and Wu. 
(2006)
Working capital 
requirement/ total 
assets
Business indicator measured by business cycle during recession
Business indicator measured by business cycle
Industry effect
Debt ratio
Operating cash flow
Growth opportunity
Company age
Company performance
Company size
+
-
significant 
differences
-
-
-
+
-
+
- significant
- significant
no evidence 
found
- significant
- significant
- not significant
+ significant
+ significant
+ significant
Nazir and Afza 
(2008)
Working capital 
requirement/ total 
assets
Operating cycle
Operating cash flows
Level of economic activity
Sales growth of the company
Return on assets
Tobin’s Q
Financial leverage
Company size
Industry Dummy
+
-
+
+
-
-
+ significant
+ not significant
+ not significant
+ not significant
+ significant
+ significant
- significant
+ not significant
+ significant
Appuhami 
(2008)
Working capital 
requirements
Capital expense
Operating expense
Finance expense
Operating cash flow (control)
Sales growth of the company (control)
Company performance (control)
Financial leverage (control)
-
-
-
- significant
+ significant
+ significant
- significant
+ not significant
+ not significant
+ not significant
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2008; McMAHON, 2006). companies choose conserva-
tive financing in order to have easy access to the debt 
market and lead potential investors to see them as a 
safe investment. According to Smith and kim (1994) 
and McMahon (2006), adequate levels of financial slack 
allow companies to pursue investment opportunities 
with positive net present value without issuing risky 
securities. The conventional rationale for withholding 
financial slack - cash, liquid assets or unused borrow-
ing power – is that the companies seek to avoid the 
necessity to issue shares on short notice in order to 
pursue a valuable investment opportunity (MyErS and 
MAJlUF, 1984).
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2008) suggested that the 
Pecking Order Theory explains why profitable compa-
nies are less likely to borrow – not because they have 
low debt targets but because they do not need funding 
from external sources. less profitable companies, con-
trarily, issue bonds because they do not have enough 
internal funds to finance investment decisions. There-
fore these companies also prefer to issue debts before 
issuing new shares. According to this theory, managers 
from less profitable and highly profitable companies 
alike would choose a more aggressive working capital 
policy, pressuring for lower levels of current assets 
and higher levels of financing from suppliers, resorting 
to internal sources for the necessary funds to finance 
their companies and to avoid issuing debt and equity. 
The purpose of the first hypothesis of this study is to 
understand whether companies with a high level of 
debt also have a low level of working capital reflected 
in a low level of inventory, low credit terms and high 
payment terms, due to the choice of managers for an 
aggressive working capital management in order to 
avoid issuing new debt and equity.
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship be-
tween the debt level of a company and its working 
capital level.
The Agency theory
According to the Agency Theory (JENSEN and MEck-
lINg, 1976), a company can be considered the nexus 
of a set of contract relationships (both implicit and 
explicit ones) among individuals, by which sharehold-
ers – principals – delegate everyday decisions of busi-
ness management to managers – agents – who should 
use their specific knowledge and the resources of the 
company to maximize returns for principals. In these 
contracts, or internal “rules of the game”, shareholders 
specify “[…] the rights of each agent in the organization, 
the performance criteria on which agents are evaluat-
ed, and the payoff functions they face […]” (FAMA and 
JENSEN, 1983, p. 2). Due to a non-rational, opportu-
nistic behavior of agents (JENSEN, 1994), the interests 
and decisions of managers are not always aligned to 
those of the shareholders, which causes agency costs or 
agency problems. For Shleider and vishny (1997), the 
essence of agency problem is the separation of owner-
ship and control. In large and complex organizations, 
these problems can be easily found, since the valuable, 
specific knowledge required to control decisions is dif-
fused among many internal agents across the company 
(FAMA and JENSEN, 1983). In this case, owners are 
unable to participate in the ratification and monitoring 
of each decision due to the high costs associated to it. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency cost as the 
sum of the monitoring expenses incurred by principal, 
the bonding expenses incurred by agents and the in-
evitable residual loss derived from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
In order to minimize interest divergences, prin-
cipals can establish incentives, monitoring mecha-
nisms and instruments to make sure that agents will 
not take actions that jeopardize their interests, or to 
be compensated (“bonding costs”) in case of agency 
problems. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the 
agency problems could be minimized by separating 
the ratification and monitoring of decisions from their 
initiation and implementation. Therefore, organizations 
should rely on decision control systems such as a for-
mal decision-making hierarchy, a mutual monitoring 
system and an active board of directors. Weir and la-
ing (2003) distinguished three mechanisms designed to 
protect shareholder interests: incentive, monitoring and 
disciplinary mechanisms. Incentive mechanisms include 
executive director shareholding or board compensa-
tion systems (JENSEN e MEcklINg, 1976); monitoring 
mechanisms include, for example, the ratio of outside 
directors in the board (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983); and disciplinary mechanisms include the mar-
ket for corporate control (JENSEN, 1986). Shareholders 
design monitoring devices in order to align the actions 
of agents to their interests (FAMA, 1980). According to 
Tirole (2005), monitoring systems include a variety of 
instruments such as board composition, auditors, large 
shareholders, large creditors, investment banks, etc.
Deciding the way to invest internal funds is cen-
tral in shareholders and managers conflicting interests Nathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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(JENSEN, 1986). According to Easterbrook (1984), when 
managers have a substantial part of their capital or 
wealth allocated in shares of the company, they tend to 
take decisions to enhance its probability and survival. 
These decisions can lead to a conservative management 
of working capital by reducing the risk involved in the 
operation of the business, e.g., by keeping high levels 
of inventory beyond process cycle necessities, offering 
credit terms above product turnover, accepting low pay-
ment terms that are not aligned to market practices, etc. 
In this case, these investment decisions would translate 
into an excess of working capital. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis of this study aims to investigate whether 
companies under monitoring mechanisms of manag-
ers have lower levels of working capital requirement.
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship be-
tween management monitoring mechanisms and 
working capital level. 
According to Jensen (1986), managers with sub-
stantial free cash flow tend to feel encouraged to 
engage the company in unnecessary expenses. He 
defined free cash flow as the excess of cash flow be-
yond the necessary to fund all projects with positive 
net present values, when discounted at the relevant 
cost of capital. In organizations with low level of 
monitoring or discipline over management actions, a 
high level of free cash flow may encourage managers 
to follow their own interests and undertake negative 
present value capital projects rather than return cash 
to equity holders (McMAHON, 2006). Jensen (1986) 
suggests that managers tend to invest free cash flow in 
new projects because they are motivated to lead their 
companies to grow beyond optimal size. company 
growth increases the power of managers by increasing 
the resources under their control, which is also associ-
ated with increased manager compensation, commonly 
linked to sales. According to McMahon (2006, p. 15), 
“[…] retaining free cash flow is essentially a negative 
net present value investment in liquidity […]”. There-
fore, companies with high a level of free cash flow may 
have higher agency costs derived from  organizational 
inefficiencies or investments with negative returns. The 
third research hypothesis aims to explore if compa-
nies with high levels of free cash flow also have high 
levels of working capital, represented by an excessive 
difference between current assets and liabilities as a 
result of ineffective policy and more conservative use 
of working capital management.
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship be-
tween the level of free cash flow and the level of 
working capital.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and data collection
The present study is partly an exploratory research, 
although it was based on consolidated theories of 
corporate finance. In order to address its hypotheses, 
this study considered the listed companies in São 
Paulo Stock Exchange as its population. Secondary 
data were collected from 357 public companies for 
the period from 1994 to 2008, excluding companies in 
the financial service industry, from Economática Pro® 
and DIvEXT B&MF BOvESPA. All financial data were 
adjusted according to IPcA/ IBgE inflation indices. In 
order to obtain a balanced panel, missing data were 
eliminated, which led to a sample of 120 companies 
for the period from 2001 to 2008. In addition, this 
study eliminated the effect of outliers by analyzing key 
tests conducted using econometric software. The final 
sample size focused 93 companies during 32 quarters, 
for the period from 2001 to 2008. 
Before discussing the variables of this study, it is 
noteworthy that there is no consolidated theory about 
working capital management, which will probably be 
designed in the future. However, the model used in this 
study is based on several theories of corporate finance; 
our model is in line with the study by Hill, kelly and 
Highfield (2010), which is based on the United States 
corporate context.
Dependent variable: working capital 
management
This study measured working capital management 
using the concept of cash conversion cycle (ccc), 
also known as cash cycle, which was used in many 
studies (DElOOF, 2003; lAzArIDIS and TryFONI-
DIS, 2006; BrIgHAM and EHrHArDT, 2002). cash 
conversion cycle measures the period of time in days 
between the payment for raw materials and the re-
ceivables of finished product sales [number of days 
of accounts receivable + number of days of inventory 
– number of days of accounts payable]. cash conver-
sion cycle combines the working capital components 
related to operational processes, reflecting the pur-
chasing, production and sales processes. (HAWAWINI,   articles  KEY FACTORS IN WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET
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vIAllET and vOrA, 1986). Additionally, we studied 
other proxies for working capital management, in or-
der to separately explore working capital components: 
days of accounts receivable (D_Ar), days of inventory   
(D_IN) and days of accounts payable (D_AP). The 
study chose to calculate them based on Shin and 
Soenen definition (1998). The number of days of ac-
counts receivable was calculated as [account receiv-
able x 365]/sales. The number of days inventories was 
calculated as [inventories x 365]/ Sales. The number of 
days accounts payable was calculated as [accounts pay-
able x 365]/ sales. We also included  working capital 
requirement (Wcr), as a fifth proxy, calculated by [ac-
counts receivable + inventory]/ [total assets – financial 
assets]. Financial assets were excluded in order to re-
move the effect of shares of other companies unrelated 
to the operational activities of the studied companies   
(DElOOF, 2003). like cash conversion cycle, working 
capital requirement is also a measure for investment 
in working capital. 
Independent variable: debt level
Nazir and Afza (2008) and chiou, cheng and Wu 
(2006) measured debt level according to debt ratio 
leverage calculated as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. Apphumani (2008) measured leverage as total 
long-term debt capital divided by equity. In this study, 
debt level (DEBT) was measured as long term debt 
divided by total assets. 
Independent variable: management monitoring 
mechanisms
The concept of corporate governance is based on the 
agency theory, relying on the assumption that manag-
ers do not always act according to the shareholders 
interests (BEcHT, BOlTON and rOEll, 2003 and TI-
rOlE, 2005). Becht, Bolton and roell (2003) proposed 
five mechanisms to minimize agency conflicts: (1) 
board election to represent shareholders interests; (2) 
hostile takeovers or dispute for vote representation by 
a large shareholder; (3) active and frequent monitor-
ing by a large shareholder or an intermediate financial 
part (banks, holding companies or pension funds); (4) 
alignment of managers interests using compensation 
contracts; and, (5) clear cEO fiduciary duties either 
to avoid corporate decisions against shareholders in-
terests or to compensate them for damaging actions. 
This study focuses on three key monitoring mecha-
nisms of working capital management: board composi-
tion, ownership concentration by large shareholders, 
and management compensation. The presence of out-
side directors decreases the probabilities of collusive 
arrangements and expropriation of shareholder wealth 
(FAMA, 1980). Board composition was measured ac-
cording to the participation of outside directors (OUT-
DIr), calculated by the number of outside directors 
divided by total directors. Management monitoring by 
large investors (ownership concentration) was mea-
sured using a dummy variable (cONc) that assumed 
ownership concentration to occur when one investor 
owned over 20% of the shares of a company, accord-
ing to the studies by Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) 
and Siqueira (1998). Management monitoring using 
management compensation was measured by a dummy 
variable (cOMP) which indicates annual compensation 
connected to company profits. 
Independent variable: free cash flow
This study measured free cash flow using a measure 
applied by lehn and Poulsen (1989) which was also 
used by rahman and Mohd-Saleh (2008). The calcu-
lation is shown in equation 1 below:
FCL = (INC – TAX – INTEXP – PSDIV – CSDIV)/TA   (1)
  where: Fcl = free cash flow; INc = operating 
income before depreciation; TAX = total taxes;   
INTEXP = interest expenses; PSDIv = preferred 
share dividends; cSDIv = common share dividends; 
and, TA = total assets at beginning of fiscal year. 
We measured free cash flow using the logarithm 
of the equation above.
Control variables
large companies are able to make large investments in 
working capital since they can use their market power 
to bargain with suppliers and have their payment terms 
decreased (kIEScHNIck, lAPlANTE and MOUSSAWI, 
2006). company size (SIzE) was calculated using the 
logarithm for company sales (DElOOF, 2003).
Prior studies (NUNN, 1981; HAWAWINI, vIAllET 
and vOrA, 1986; kIEScHNIck, lAPlANTE and MOUS-
SAWI, 2006; NAzIr and AFzA, 2008) suggested that 
working capital practices may differ among industries. 
consequently, it was important to control for the impact 
of industry practices on a study about the key factors 
of working capital management practices. This study Nathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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used dummies for the three main economy sectors: in-
dustry (IND), commerce (cOM) and services and other 
industries (OTH).
Sales growth, which can also represent future 
growth opportunities, can have an impact on work-
ing capital management since managers can decide to 
prepare the company to meet a different demand level, 
such as building up inventories for future sales growth 
(NUNN, 1981; kIEScHNIck, lAPlANTE and MOUS-
SAWI, 2006). The sales growth variable (grOWTH) 
was measured by [this year’s sales - previous year’s 
sales]/previous year’s sales (DElOOF, 2003; NAzIr e 
AFzA, 2008; APPUHAMI, 2008). It is noteworthy that 
other studies replaced this variable by Tobin’s q as a 
measure of growth opportunities; we chose not to use 
it due to limitations related to this index in Brazilian 
companies. One of the reasons is the low liquidity of 
many shares in the Brazilian market.
Model specification
This study used panel data models consisting of a time 
series for each cross-section member in the data panel 
(WOOlDrIDgE, 2002). According to Baltagi (2008), 
panel data allow researchers to obtain reliable estimates 
and to find and estimate effects that pure cross-sections 
and time-series data cannot detect; moreover, panel 
data do not require  restrictive assumptions. This study 
conducted the following tests: static panel data of fixed 
effects, static panel data of random effects, dynamic 
panel data, pooled ordinary least squares (OlS) and 
feasible generalized least squares (FglS). We processed 
the panel data models and conducted the key tests of 
this study using the econometrics software grETl 1.8.5, 
which is distributed as a free package.
Equation 2 considers cash conversion cycle as a 
proxy for a dependent variable, in the form of a fixed 
effects static model and it can illustrate the models 
used in this study. 
 
(2)
  Where: i = 1, ..., N, = company; t = 1, ..., T = time; 
ccc = cash conversion cycle; DEBT = debt level; 
OUTDIr = outside directors participating in the 
board; cONc = dummy for ownership concen-
tration; cOMP =dummy for annual compensa-
tion linked to profit; FcF = free cash flow; SIzE = 
company size; grOWTH = company growth; IND 
= dummy for industry; cOM = dummy for com-
merce; OTH = dummy for other industry sectors 
(not appearing in the equation because it is the 
omitted variable); β = regression parameter; and, 
μ = residual error. 
Exhibits 2 and 3 show a summary of the hypotheses, 
proxies for dependent variables, independent variables, 
control variables and expected relations in this study.
RESULTS
We calculated the ordinary least square multiple lin-
ear regressions, then tested them for multicollinearity 
and serial correlation. With regards to multicollinear-
ity, the variance inflation factor (vIF) was calculated, 
and no multicollinearity was found. We also used 
the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix and found 
low correlation coefficients for all independent vari-
able proxies; therefore, no multicollinearity problems 
were found.
The null hypothesis for homocedasticity was re-
jected using White’s Test. Therefore, the multiple linear 
regression of feasible generalized least squares (FglS) 
was applied to correct the heterocedasticity problem. 
Next, the multiple linear regressions for both dynamic 
and static panel data (with fixed and random effects) 
were calculated. A total of 15 regression equations 
where included in the results of relations between work-
ing capital management proxies, independent variable 
proxies and control variables. Three tests were con-
ducted, and their results used as the basis to compare 
the regression equations with regard to their explaining 
power. The first test was conducted in order to choose 
between the ordinary least squares model and the fixed 
effect panel data model. All models presented results 
that excluded the hypothesis of ordinary least squares. 
The second test, the lagrange multiplier test of Breusch-
Pagan, was conducted in order to test for an unobserved 
effect (WOOlDrIDgE, 2002). All results excluded the 
hypothesis of random effect explanatory power. The 
third was the Haussmann test, which compares fixed 
and random effects estimators, excluding the hypoth-
esis of random effect. Therefore, the fixed effect model 
was found to have more explanatory power over the 
key factors of working capital compared to the others, articles  KEY FACTORS IN WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET
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suggesting that intercepts vary between  companies, but 
not over time. Table 1 shows a summary of the results 
of the fixed effects model.
Debt level
A significant negative relation was found between in-
dependent variable debt level (DEBT), cash conversion 
Proxies for dependent variable 
working capital management
Independent 
variables
Proxies for inde-
pendent variables
Formulas
Expected 
sign
H1
CCC: Cash Conversion Cycle
WCR: Working Capital Requirement
D_AR: Days of Accounts Receivable
D_IN: Days of Inventory
D_AP: Days of Accounts Payable
Debt level DEBT: Total debt level 
at book value
= [total liabilities]/ total 
assets
-
-
-
-
+
H2
CCC: Cash Conversion Cycle
WCR: Working Capital Requirement
D_AR: Days of Accounts Receivable
D_IN: Days of Inventory
D_AP: Days of Accounts Payable
Management 
monitoring  
mechanisms
OUTDIR: Participation 
of outside directors 
in the board
= number of outside 
directors / number of total 
directors in the board
-
-
-
-
+
CCC: Cash Conversion Cycle
WCR: Working Capital Requirement
D_AR: Days of Accounts Receivable
D_IN: Days of Inventory
D_AP: Days of Accounts Payable
CONC: Presence of 
ownership concen-
tration
= Dummy for ownership 
concentration above 20% 
by one investor
-
-
-
-
+
CCC: Cash Conversion Cycle
WCR: Working Capital Requirement
D_AR: Days of Accounts Receivable
D_IN: Days of Inventory
D_AP: Days of Accounts Payable
COMP: Presence of 
annual compensation 
connected to profit
= Dummy of annual  
management compensa-
tion connected to profit
-
-
-
-
+
H3
CCC: Cash Conversion Cycle
WCR: Working Capital Requirement
D_AR: Days of Accounts Receivable
D_IN: Days of Inventory
D_AP: Days of Accounts Payable
Free Cash Flow FCL: Free cash flow = Log [Free Cash Flow/ 
total assets]
+
+
+
+
-
Exhibit 2 – Summary of variables, proxies and expected signs of the problematic 
key factors of working capital management in this study
CONTROL VARIABLES FORMULAS
SIZE: company size = Log [total sales]
GROWTH: Sales growth = [this year’s sales - previous year’s sales]/previous year’s sales 
IND, COM, OTH = Dummy for economy sectors
Exhibit 3 – Summary of control variablesNathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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cycle (ccc) and working capital requirement (Wcr) 
– different measures for investment of working capi-
tal. This finding is consistent with the Pecking Order 
Theory, which is reflected in the first hypothesis of 
this study; it is also consistent with the studies by chi-
ou, cheng and Wu (2006) and Nazir and Afza (2008). 
It suggests that companies with a high debt leverage 
choose a more efficient management of working capital 
in order to avoid issuing new bonds and shares. This 
interpretation is reinforced by the analysis of debt ef-
fects over days of inventory (D_IN), suggesting that 
companies with an increased debt level tend to work 
with a low inventory level. The significant, positive re-
lationship with days of accounts payable suggests that 
significantly leveraged companies tend to negotiate for 
increased payment terms with suppliers. With regard to 
the variable days of accounts receivable, the significant, 
positive result found suggests that companies with high 
debt levels normally have high credit terms. 
Management monitoring mechanisms
The second hypothesis of this study aimed to ex-
plore the monitoring mechanisms over managers 
decisions as key factors of working capital man-
agement. None of the proxy relations found were 
statistically significant except for two, namely, 
the participation of outside directors in the board 
(OUTDIr) and working capital requirement (Wcr). 
However, the positive result was contrary to our 
expectations, suggesting that a larger presence of 
outside directors could not minimize agency costs, 
as found by kieschnick, laplante and Moussawi 
(2006). Despite our intention to measure the im-
pact of management monitoring mechanisms on 
working capital management, our findings were 
inconclusive. This is probably due to the fact that 
the public data available are still insufficient to be 
considered as proxies for this independent vari-
able in Brazil. 
Dependent variable’s proxies
CCC WCR D_AR D_IN D_AP
Independent variables and proxies
Debt 
-53.928
(-2.304)**
-0.221
(-4.911)***
49.950
(1.698)*
-19.599
(-1.958)*
84.279
(3.982)***
Free cash flow
-4.390
(-1.754)*
-0.004
(-1.490)
-2.798
(-1.282)
-2.568
(-3.660)***
-0.975
(-0.8913)
Management monitoring mechanisms
Presence of ownership concentration
-24.647
(-0.9635)
0.020
(1.263)
-14.377
(-0.840)
-24.962
(-1.069)
-14.692
(-1.015)
Participation of outside directors in 
the board
5.520
(1.007)
0.024
(2.602)***
3.972
(0.8802)
-1.772
(-0.4858)
-3.320
(-0.8617)
Presence of annual compensation 
connected to profit
-9.810
(-1.526)
-0.002
(-0.1544)
0.156
(0.0454)
-7.390
(-1.374)
2.577
(0.5509)
Control variables
Company size 
-39.481
(-1.565)
0.062
(1.546)
-55.933
(-2.591)***
-28.468
(-1.670)*
-44.920
(-2.594)***
Company growth 
-19.046
(-2.769)***
-0.0004
(-0.03192)
-27.030
(-3.945)***
-11.155
(-2.787)***
-19.139
(-3.005)***
Constant
308.384
(2.606)***
-0.084
(-0.4058)
373.568
(3.536)***
224.314
(2.973)***
289.498
(3.470)***
Number of observations 1409 1409 1409 1409 1409
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.07 0.73 0.76 0.64
Note: t-test in parentheses: *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at10% level.
Table 1 – Multiple linear regression in panel data for generalized least squares with fixed effectsarticles  KEY FACTORS IN WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET
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Free cash flow
The third hypothesis of this study aimed to investigate 
whether companies with large free cash flow also had 
a high level of working capital, understood as high-
er inventories and a more generous credit policy. A 
negative, statistically significant relationship between 
free cash flow (FcF) and the variables cash conver-
sion cycle (ccc) and days of inventory (D_IN) was 
found. These findings are contrary to our expecta-
tions. A possible interpretation is the impact of prof-
itability on the composition of the free cash flow for-
mula. The variable profitability could be a key factor 
of working capital management to be tested in future 
empirical studies.
Control variables
company size (SIzE) was found to be both strongly and 
negatively related to days of inventory (D_IN). This sug-
gests that large companies do not need to build large 
inventories proportionally to sales increase, or that large 
companies can coordinate their supply chain more ef-
ficiently than small ones. Days of accounts receivable 
(D_Ar) was also negatively associated with company 
size, indicating that large companies work with lower 
receivable terms, which could be explained by their 
market power. Similar results, although not statistically 
relevant, were found for the variable cash conversion 
cycle (ccc). These results were contrary to the stud-
ies by chiou, cheng and Wu (2006); and, kieschnick, 
laplante and Moussawi (2006), which found work-
ing capital inefficiencies to be positively correlated to 
company size. A negative, significant relationship was 
found between Days of accounts payable (D_AP) and 
company size, suggesting that large companies normally 
wait less to settle their debts.
A negative relation was found between company 
growth (grOWTH) and working capital management, 
suggesting that lower growth companies invest more in 
working capital. One possible reason is that companies 
with a high growth level have higher internal funds 
to finance their growth, as proposed by the Pecking 
Order Theory. 
Due to a restriction in the econometric software, 
this study grouped the 18 industrial sectors extracted 
from Economática Pro® into three economy sectors – 
industry, commerce and others. Because of the large 
ratio of companies from the industrial sector in the 
sample, industrial sector variables were not included 
in the regression models; consequently, this study 
was unable to assess their effects on working capital 
management.
CONCLUSIONS
The present study aimed to contribute to the under-
standing of short-term financial decisions by inves-
tigating the key factors of working capital manage-
ment. It used a sample of 93 companies listed in São 
Paulo Stock Exchange (BOvESPA) for the period from 
2001 to 2004, in a quarterly basis. After reviewing 
the existing literature, we found that few research-
ers have explored key factors of working capital by 
investigating several independent variables: industry 
characteristics, economic activities, operational pro-
cess indicators, management monitoring mechanisms, 
company growth, company size, market power, debt 
level, among others. Their studies were conducted in 
many different countries with different economic situ-
ations, and they were based on different economet-
ric models, leading to no clear consensus. given the 
absence of mathematical models and specific, widely 
tested theories, we chose to explore the above men-
tioned key factors inspired on robust theories of cor-
porate finance.
This study found evidence that companies with a 
high level of debt choose to work with lower levels of 
working capital, which was consistent with previous 
studies (cHIOU, cHENg and WU, 2006; NAzIr and 
AFzA, 2008). These findings corroborate the Pecking 
Order Theory and suggest that as companies increase 
their financial leverage, they tend to assume a more 
restrictive policy in working capital management in 
order to prevent capital consumption in accounts 
receivable and inventory and to avoid issuing new 
bonds and shares. This study did not find statistically 
significant evidence of the impact of proxies for man-
agement monitoring mechanisms on working capital 
management. Nevertheless, the relation between own-
ership concentration and annual compensation con-
nected to profit was found to have a negative sign in 
most cases. This suggests that companies with large 
investors and compensation instruments can inhibit 
decisions involving excess of current assets beyond 
their operational needs. 
The results regarding the impact of free cash flow 
on working capital management were contrary to our 
expectations, suggesting that companies with a low Nathalie Vicente Nakamura Palombini     Wilson Toshiro Nakamura
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level of free cash flow have a higher level of working 
capital. A possible explanation can be the impact of 
company profitability on free cash flow measures. In 
this case, company profitability could affect working 
capital management. This proposition could be tested in 
future studies. With regard to the control variables, this 
study suggests that large companies and companies with 
high growth rates have lower working capital levels. A 
negative, significant relation with the variable days of 
accounts payable was also found, suggesting that smaller 
companies and companies with lower growth rates wait 
longer to settle their debts. Finally, no statistically relevant 
evidence was found to support that the dependent vari-
able working capital management could be influenced 
by past behavior for the same variable.
This study found limitations which could be ad-
dressed in future studies. In order to increase knowl-
edge about short-term investment and financing deci-
sions, our suggestions are: to investigate alternative 
ways of measuring industry sector impact on working 
capital management; to study the impact of profitability 
as a key factor, as explained above; to find alternative 
proxies to measure management monitoring mecha-
nisms, in spite of the limitations of public databases 
in Brazil; and, finally, to study the impact of external 
factors (interests, economic activity, credit volume, 
bankruptcy, risk, etc.).
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